Hague Evidence Convention: A Practical Guide to the Convention, United States Case Law, Convention - Sponsored Review Commissions (1978 and 1985), and Responses of Other Signatory Nations: with Digest of Cases and Bibliography by Dunham, Denise L.
NOTES
HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION, UNITED STATES CASE
LAW, CONVENTION-SPONSORED REVIEW
COMMISSIONS (1978 AND 1985), AND RESPONSES OF
OTHER SIGNATORY NATIONS: WITH DIGEST OF
CASES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of the scope of an attorney's practice, at some point,
evidence located abroad will be needed to settle a dispute. This is
true whether the attorney is involved in a civil or commercial practice,
is a solo practitioner, or is a partner in a larger firm. For example,
a client may be injured as a result of a defective engine which was
manufactured in West Germany. Or, the client may become involved
in an antitrust action involving foreign-based corporations.'
The response a court should make to a discovery request involving
nationals of a foreign country or evidence located within a foreign
country are issues addressed by the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 2 This Note
Recently, The Washington Post National Weekly Edition reported:
The increasing globalization of consumer and industrial markets, the
desire to buy a stake in the relatively robust U.S. economy, and, more
recently, the decline of the dollar have ignited a new interest among some
of the largest foreign multinational corporations in making acquisitions in
the United States.
Wash. Post Nat'l. Wkly. Ed., Nov. 4, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
- The Hague Convention of March 18, 1970, on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted in
28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 88 (West Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
The United States ratified the treaty in 1972. The treaty is currently in force among
Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 at 94
(Barbados, Cyrpus, and Singapore were not represented at the original signing of
the Convention; therefore, it is only in force between those nations which have
specifically accepted the accession according to article 39, paragraph 4). For a
complete list of each country's reservations and declarations, see 28 U.S.C.A. §
1781 at 94-106.
Additionally, the following countries have expressed some degree of interest in
the Hague Convention and have sent observers to meetings in which progress of the
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reviews the terms of the Convention itself, the application of this
treaty by United States courts, the responses to that action made by
several Hague Convention signatory nations, as well as the findings
of the Special Commission3 which reviewed the use and non-use of
the treaty in May 1985.
4
In addition to providing the practicing attorney with a practical
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction digest of United States case law involving
discovery requests which implicate the Convention (Appendix A) and
a bibliography of materials on the Convention (Appendix B), this
Note proposes a balancing/comity analysis for use by courts con-
fronted with discovery requests involving foreign nationals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Basic Differences Between Civil Law and Common Law
Evidence-Taking Procedures
Because discovery procedures vary greatly between nations, the
choice of evidence-taking procedures afforded by various nations may
affect enormously the amount and the type of evidence obtained.
The greatest differences exist between the procedures of common law
and civil law nations. The following illustration uses the United States
as an example of the common law approach5 and the Federal Republic
Convention is monitored and discussed: Arab Republic of Egypt, Agentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Japan, People's Republic of China, Spain,
Switzerland and Uruguay. It is unknown whether any of these countries will sign
the treaty in the near future. Countries expressing interest are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Egypt, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland. See Report on
the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, 24 I.L.M. 1668 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Second Report]
O'Kane, Obtaining Evidence Abroad, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 69, 69-71 (1984);
Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Delegation
Report].
In May 1985, the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Con-
vention of 18 March 1970 on The Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters met for its second meeting at the Hague. Second Report, supra note 2.
4 Id.; see also infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 7-11. It should be noted that not all common law countries
afford their litigants the broad discovery available to United States litigants under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. England, for example, has criticized United
States discovery requests for over thirty years as being "overly intrusive and un-
supervised." Note, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters - A Comparison with Federal Rules Procedures, 7
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 365, 406 (1981). In fact, it was the United Kingdom which
proposed that the Hague Convention include a provision (later adopted as article
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of Germany as an example of the civil law approach 6 to obtaining
evidence.
United States litigants enjoy broad powers of discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Any information may be discovered
provided it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.8 Discovery may be conducted by stipulation of the
parties with little interference by the court.9 Additionally, the Federal
Rules contain provisions for compelling participation in the discovery
process.' 0 Deponents are required to testify under oath while a court
23) to allow nations to declare that they would not execute Letters of Request under
the Convention which sought pre-trial discovery as known in United States courts.
Id. at 406-07. For an in-depth description of English procedures, see Myrick and
Love, Obtaining Evidence Abroad For Use in United States Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J.
585, 597-609 (1981).
6 See, infra notes 12-19. Another civil law country with which United States
courts frequently have contact is France. For an in-depth description of French
procedures, see Borel and Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining
Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35
(1979). In addition to having problems with the basic differences between the two
types of systems, some nations have enacted blocking statutes to further frustrate
discovery attempts under the liberal United States discovery provisions. See infra
notes 47-49, 56-58 and accompanying text.
I FED. R. Civ. P. 26. For a discussion of discovery methods available in federal
courts, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 81 at 543-
51 (4th ed. 1983).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26. "No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition'
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also WRIGHT, supra note
7, § 81 at 543-44.
The fear of a fishing expedition prompted the United Kingdom to propose that
the article 23 provision be included within the Convention. See supra note 5.
Unfortunately, the actions of United States courts have not served to allay other
signatory nations' fears, as evidenced by the fact that the meaning of "pre-trial
discovery" was one of the main topics of discussion at a meeting during the summer
of 1985 of the special commission on the operation of the Hague Convention. See
Second Report, supra note 2; Report of the United States Delegation to the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (HCOPIL) Special Commission Meeting,
May 28-31, 1985 (telegram report to the United States Secretary of State) (available
from George Taft, Attorney Advisor, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520) [hereinafter cited as Second Delegation Telegram].
See also infra notes 43-46, 50-55 and accompanying text.
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 29. Prior to the 1970 amendment of this rule, only depositions
could be taken by stipulation. FED. R. Civ. P. 29 advisory committee note, reprinted
in MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE: FEDERAL CIVIL RULES at 315 (Part 1, 1985).
The 1970 amendment provided a formal mechanism in the rules for the common
practice of parties agreeing to other procedural variations. Id.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 37. In addition to compelling discovery, the courts can impose
sanctions for failure to comply with such orders. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). See generally
WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 90 at 596-601 (discussion of Rule 37(b) procedures).
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reporter records their testimony verbatim. Finally, deposition tran-
scripts are available to all parties upon request."
Because there is no jury in civil cases in civil law countries such
as West Germany, the evidentiary procedures are quite different.' 2
First, "pretrial discovery"' 3 as known in the United States does not
exist in West Germany. Instead, the judge controls the taking of
evidence. ' 4 The court, rather than the parties, chooses the documents'5
and witnesses' 6 it will examine based upon the allegations of the
" FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c). The witness has a right to read the transcript and make
a note of any changes and the reason for such changes. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(e).
WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 84 at 572 n.45 and text. These changes will be sent to the
other parties and a copy will be placed with the original transcript.
12 Heck, Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC, 18 INT'L LAW. 793, 794
(1984); Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The
Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooper-
ation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 466 (1983).
See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
Because "[tihe main function of the German court is to find the truth, not
merely to determine whether the burden-of-proof-bearing party actually produced
sufficient evidence to carry his burden," Martens, German Civil Procedure and the
Implementation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 1 INT'L LIT. Q. 115, 118 (1985),
"the judge maintains complete control of the entire litigation from the day the
action is filed until the day he puts his hand to the final judgment." Id. (this
publication of the International Litigation Committee of the ABA Section of Liti-
gation is available from David Brent, Liaison, American Bar Association Section
of Litigation, 750 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60611). Further, a party
before a German court must be able to prove. the allegations contained in the
pleading, and must offer the sources of such proof within the pleading itself. Id.
"Such a proffer of evidence may include, for example, the names and addresses of
witnesses and a description of documents relating to specific issues." Id.
There are five methods for proving a party's allegations: personal inspection by
the court, examination of non-party witnesses, examination of experts, submission
of documents, and examination of the parties. Id. at 119.
'5 In proving allegations by the use of documents, a party can only use documents
which it already has in its possession. Heck, supra note 12, at 793-94 (quoting a
German Supreme Court case which held that "a party is not required to help its
opponent to victory by making available material that [the opponent] does not have
at its disposal already"). This is because there is no general rule in German procedural
law by which a party or witness could be compelled to produce documents that are
in its possession. Martens, supra note 14, at 122. Thus, document production as
known in the United States is "unknown in German law." Id.
'6 Witnesses in a civil law country are not witnesses of a party, but witnesses of
the court. Further, parties to a suit cannot give testimony as witnesses in civil law
countries because of the notion that "parties cannot be expected to be impartial to
their own case." Heck, supra note 12, at 795.
For purposes of this rule, certain persons are treated as being identical
to a party and are, therefore, disqualified as witnesses. Examples are the
members of the board of directors (Vorstand) of a stock corporation
(Aktiengesellschaft AG); the managing director(s) (Geschaftsfuhrer) of a
company with limited liability (Gesellschaftmit beschrankter Haftung, GmbH),
the general partner(s) (Komplementare) of a limited partnership (Komman-
ditgesellschaft, KG), and all partners in a partnership, be it a commercial
[Vol. 16:73
1986] HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION 77
complaint. 7 Second, the court, rather than the parties, questions
witnesses with little input from the parties and their attorneys. 8
partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft, dHG), or a private partnership
(burgerlich-rechtliche Gesellschaft).
Martens, supra note 14, at 121.
Parties may be allowed to 'testify in one of three situations. The judge might
allow the parties to give an informal explanation of their positions. Id. The judge
may, sua sponte, order that one or both parties testify. This rule is rarely invoked.
Id. at 122. Finally, a party may testify when an issue cannot be resolved otherwise.
In this situation, "a party may move that its opponent testify as a secondary form
of evidence." Id. at 121. Because a party-witness may not be forced to testify, id.,
this method is of questionable effectiveness, "although the court may, under § 446
ZPO, draw conclusions from a refusal to testify." Id. at 122.
An early draft of the Convention contained an additional provision which
excluded mandatory compulsion of the parties to the action. This was
included to take care of the practice in some civil law states, notably in
France, under which a party to an action cannot compel testimony from
its adversary. This provision was ultimately deleted from Article 10 as
redundant. Since compulsion is, by definition, limited to the practice of
the state of execution, compulsion in civil law countries will necessarily be
limited by the domestic taw of those countries; if that law excludes com-
pulsion against a party in domestic actions, it will automatically exclude
compulsion against parties in the execution of a Letter of Request (footnotes
omitted).
1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, at 215-16 (1984), reprinted in
Martens, supra note 14, at 121, n.17.
,7 See supra note 14. Based upon the allegations in the pleadings, the court decides
the issues it considers to be relevant. It then issues a formal evidence order ("Bweisbe-
schluss") rephrasing the parties' contentions deemed relevant by the court and
determining whether evidence proffered by the parties is to be taken for proof.
Martens, supra note 14, at 118-19.
11 After the court has summoned the witness to appear in an evidence-taking
session, the court first asks the witness to give his or her testimony. This testimony
is restricted to the "subject matter as stated in the evidence order and in the witness
summons." Id. at 120. Once the court is satisfied that the witness is sufficiently
knowledgeable about the subject matter, it then poses specific questions it deems
necessary to fulfill its duty to ascertain the truth. Heck, supra note 12, at 795. The
attorneys, and occassionally the parties, are then given an opportunity to put ad-
ditional questions to the witness. Those questions may refer only to the subject
matter of the examination as stated in the evidence order. Attorneys are sometimes
reluctant to ask too many questions because the court may consider this a criticism
of its own examination of the witness (the judge's examination was supposed to
have touched upon all relevant questions). Thus, German civil procedure is unfamiliar
with witness cross examination as allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Martens, supra note 14, at 120.
German courts, however, have loosened the restrictions placed on witness ex-
aminations under the Hague Convention:
In complex cases, such as American antitrust litigation, the judge will
not be in a position fully to identify the relevant legal issues and to ask
the "right question," no matter how well briefed he or she is. Realistically,
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Additionally, rather than a verbatim transcript of a witness' testimony,
the judge dictates only a summary of the testimony at the conclusion
of the examination. 9
B. The Hague Evidence Convention0
The Hague Evidence Convention2' was designed to bridge some of
the differences in evidence-taking procedures between civil law and
common law nations. 22 Although the Convention superseded the evi-
the judge is well advised to leave most or all of the questioning to the
attorneys for the parties. The requesting court may even move for a "special
method or procedure," [HC art. 9(2)] allowing the parties and their attorneys
to do the questioning with judicial supervision of the proceedings to safe-
guard the rights of the witnesses. Such a procedure would not be incom-
patible with German law, but may entail reimbursement of the resulting
additional costs [HC art. 14(2)1.
Id.
'" Shemanski, supra note 12, at 468. In fact, the judge rephrases only that part
of the witness' testimony he feels is important. However, a party might move to
have specific parts of the witness' testimony recorded verbatim. Martens, supra note
14, at 120.
Additionally, "[an oath will be administered only if the court holds that it is
necessary for securing a true statement from the witness, or upon motion by one
of the parties." Id. Because a German judge often will not know the true relevance
a certain statement may have to a United States proceeding, the requesting United
States court should request a verbatim transcript. Id. at 135. However, the "[e]vidence
obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be excluded merely for the reason
that it is not a verbatim transcript or that the testimony was not taken under oath
or for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken within the
United States under these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
20 See Convention, supra note 2. The Convention was drafted by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. The Conference has as members over 29
sovereign nations which have joined together for the purpose of working for "the
progressive unification of the rules of private international law." Sandman, Gathering
Evidence Abroad: The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited, 16 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 963, 969 (1984).
2 For an excellent source of current information concerning the Hague Evidence
Convention, see PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CON-
VENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1984) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. This loose-leaf edition
contains the full text of the Convention, a list of the nations and territories to which
it applies, the original Explanatory Report on the Convention by Phillip Amram,
the Report on the Work of the Special Commission of 1978 on the Operation of
the Convention, information for each state party to the convention (including the
state's declarations and reservations), a digest of case law on the convention and a
bibliography. It can be obtained from the publisher's distributor: Butterworth (Pub-
lishers) Inc., 10 Tower Office Park, Woburn, Boston, Massachusetts 01801.
22 Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y.
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dence-taking provisions of earlier conventions,23 it did not affect
May 30, 1984) (available Jan. 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
The commentary on the Convention suggests that its purpose was to
resolve disputes between civil law and common law countries over the
gathering of evidence within the territory of one country in a form so as
to be admissible in the courts of the other ... . . The Convention was
designed to accomodate [the civil law nations'] concerns for judicial sov-
ereignty with the needs of the litigants to collect evidence within the borders
of those countries. (footnote omitted).
Id.
A commission of experts from the signatory nations which met in 1978 reported:
"[tihe meeting opened with a round-table discussion which revealed that the Con-
vention dealt with real needs and that it constituted a useful and efficient bridge
between the civil law systems and those of common law." Report on the Work of
the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 18 March 1970 on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 17 I.L.M. 1425,
1426 (1978), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 36 [hereinafter cited as
Commission Report].
In 1985, the commission met again and reported that although "the Convention
had not given rise to major problems and that its application was satisfactory ...
[iii was . . . probably not sufficiently used." Second Report, supra note 2 at 1670.
The Commission felt that this situation "was to be deplored, because its use would
help to reduce court costs substantially." Id.
Cf. McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(the Convention procedures were "designed to facilitate the process of obtaining
evidence in foreign countries without doing violence to the rights of foreign nationals
in their own countries, or to each country's notions of its own sovereignty.") See
also Edwards, Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 646, 647 (1969).
21 Convention, supra note 2, art. 29, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at
92 (West Supp. 1985).
Earlier conventions such as the Hague Convention of 1905 and the Hague Con-
vention on Civil Procedure of 1954, were exclusively between civil law nations. They
dealt with commissions rogatories (letters rogatory or letters of request) and other
techniques for obtaining evidence abroad under civil law practice. Amram, The
Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651, 651
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Amram, Proposed Evidence Convention].
The first convention between common law and civil law nations was the Hague
Convention of November 15, 1965, on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. See Amram, The Proposed
International Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A.J. 650
(1965) for a discussion of this Convention.
In 1964, the United States sought to aid foreign litigants by amending 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1781 - 1782, as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The amendments
sought
to offer to foreign countries and litigants, without a requirement of reci-
procity, wide judicial assistance on a unilateral basis for the obtaining of
evidence in the United States. The amendments . .. authorized the use in
the federal courts of evidence taken abroad in civil law countries, even if
its form did not comply with the conventional formalities of our normal
rules of evidence.
Amram, Proposed Evidence Convention, supra, at 651.
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bilateral agreements between nations. 24
Under the Hague Convention, a litigant may employ one of two
methods for obtaining evidence. 25 First, the appropriate authority 26
may execute a Letter of Request. 27 A litigant may also use a diplomatic
24 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 28 & 32, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note
at 92 (West Supp. 1985). A British article described the importance of this provision
as follows:
The United Kingdom has already concluded a large number of bilateral
Civil Procedure Conventions with civil law countries which include pro-
visions on the taking of evidence. These bilateral Conventions (which are
not affected by the provisions of the multilateral Convention - Article 32)
contain more liberal provisions for the collection of evidence than does the
latter Convention which is, nevertheless, of interest to the United Kingdom
because the taking of evidence in those countries which are members of
the Conference but with which the United Kingdom has no bilateral Civil
Procedure Convention (for example, Japan, the United Arab Republic and
Switzerland) will be considerably facilitated in the event that they are able
to ratify it.
Edwards, supra note 22, at 646.
25 "Although the use of diplomatic or consular representatives and the use of
commissioners are lumped together in Chapter II of the Convention, the report of
the United States delegation appropriately treats them as separate methods because
of the variations in the procedures applicable to each." Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 550 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also infra notes
28-29 and accompanying text.
26 Article 2 of the Convention requires each signatory nation to:
designate a Central Authority which will undertake to receive Letters of
Request coming from a judicial authority of another Contracting State and
to transmit them to the authority competent to execute them. Each State
shall organize the Central Authority in accordance with its own law.
Letters shall be sent to the Central Authority of the State of execution
without being transmitted through any other authority of that State.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 89 (West
Supp. 1985). The designated Central Authority for each signatory nation can be
found at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 94-106. The United States designated the
Department of Justice Office of International Judicial Assistance as its Central
Authority. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(1) provides that the Department of State
has the "power, directly, or through suitable channels" to receive or transmit letters
rogatory or Letters of Request. Additionally, § 1781 specifically states that it does
not preclude
(1) the transmittal of a letter rogatory or request directly from a foreign
or international tribunal to the tribunal, officer, or agency in the United
States to whom it is addressed and its return in the same manner; or
(2) the transmittal of a letter rogatory or request directly from a tribunal
in the United States to the foreign or international tribunal, officer, or
agency to whom it is addressed and its return in the same manner.
28 U.S.C. § 1781(b) (1976).
27 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 88
(West Supp. 1985). For an in-depth description of procedures, see arts. 1-14 at 28
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officer, consular agent,2 8 or commissioner2 9 to obtain evidence.
The procedures listed in the Convention are not absolute. 0 Par-
ticipating nations were permitted to make declarations and reserva-
U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 88-90. A Letter of Request under the Hague Convention is
identical to a letter rogatory provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b).
Note, supra note 5, at 374. See infra note 29 for a description of a Letter of Request
(letter rogatory) and a comparison of its procedure with that of a commission. For
a detailed description of the procedure for using a Letter of Request under the Hague
Convention, see Amram, Proposed Evidence Convention, supra note 23, at 652-54.
For selected problems in the execution of a Letter of Request, see Martens, supra
note 14, at 132-135 (includes the language of the proceedings, questioning by the
judge and the parties, privileges of the witnesses, and transcript problems).
28 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 15 and 16, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781
note at 90-91 (West Supp. 1985). The Convention sought "to eliminate restrictions
on use of diplomatic and consular officers which required provision for the separate
problems relating to witnesses who are nationals of the requesting State, -or of the
requested State, or of third States." Delegation Report, supra note 2, at 807. See
infra note 33 for Germany's declaration and policy concerning the use of diplomatic
and consular officers.
29 See Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 506-07,
109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221 (1973).
A commission, of course, authorizes a designated individual to take the
deposition of a named witness. A letter rogatory is a judicial request
addressed to a foreign court that a witness be examined within the latter's
territorial jurisdiction by written interrogatories or, if the foreign court
permits, by oral interrogatories. An important distinction is that the com-
mission is entirely under control of the court issuing it; as to the letter
rogatory, the procedure is under the control of the foreign tribunal whose
assistance is sought in the administration of justice. The federal statute
mentioned earlier (28 U.S.C. § 1781) authorizes the State Department to
act as a transmission channel for Letters Rogatory between American and
foreign courts. (citations omitted)
Id.
A commissioner nominated by the court of the state where the litigation is pending
acts as the "extended arm of the state". Delegation Report, supra note 2, at 806.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) describes the procedures used in United States
federal courts. For a discussion of the judicial sovereignty problems potentially
created by the use of commissioners in civil law nations, see infra note 100. See
also supra note 27 (discussion of the letter of request).
I" Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at
89 (West Supp. 1985) ("In civil or commercial matters a judicial authority of a
contracting state may, . . . request .... ").
Although recent commentators have argued that the Hague Convention constitutes
the exclusive method of obtaining evidence abroad, courts have held otherwise.
Compare In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985) and Murphy v.
Reifenhauser K.G. Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Ver. 1984) (Hague Con-
vention does not supersede Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) with Bishop, Significant
Issues in the Construction of the Hague Evidence Convention, 1 INT'L LIT. Q. 2
(1985) (this publication of the International Litigation Committee of the ABA Section
of Litigation is available from David Brent, Liaison, American Bar Association
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tions altering Convention provisions at the time of ratification."
Whereas under the Convention the United States was generally liberal
in the discovery powers granted to foreign litigants,32 West Germany,
like other civil law nations, strictly limited its evidence-taking pro-
cedures . 3
Section of Litigation, 750 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60611) and Sandman,
supra note 20 and Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures
for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1984) (Hague Convention procedures
constitute the exclusive method of obtaining discovery abroad).
11 For example, article 23 of the Convention permits nations to declare that they
"will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." Convention, supra
note 2, art. 23, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 92 (West. Supp. 1985).
See infra notes 39-46, 50-55 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion
of article 23 declarations.
Another important Convention provision is article 11, which allows a testifying
witness to
refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to
give the evidence -
(a) under the law of the State of execution; or
(b) under the law of the State of origin, and the privilege or duty has
been specified in the Letter, or, at the instance of the requested authority,
has been otherwise confirmed to that authority by the requesting authority.
A Contracting State may declare that, in addition, it will represent
privileges and duties existing under the law of States other than the State
of origin and the State of execution, to the extent specified in that dec-
laration.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 11, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 90 (West
Supp. 1985). The importance of this declaration becomes apparent when one considers
the fact that other nations, such as France and the United Kingdom, grant their
citizens more extensive priVileges against testifying than is granted United States
citizens under the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 5, at 394-95. For a listing of the declarations and reservations made by
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, see infra notes 32-33.
11 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 105-06 (West Supp. 1985). The United States made
no article 23 declaration forbidding Letters of Request for pretrial discovery. Cf.
supra note 31 (declaration allowed by the convention).
The United States, in fact, provided several aids to a foreign litigant seeking
discovery in the United States. For example, foreign diplomatic officers, consular
agents, and commissioners may gather evidence without prior permission of the
United States Government. Foreign agents may also enlist United States aid to compel
discovery. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 105-06 (West Supp. 1985). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1966) (transmittal of letter rogatory or request); 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1966)
(assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tri-
bunals); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (alternative provisions for service of process in a
foreign country); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (general discovery methods allowed); FED.
R. Civ. P. 28(b) (depositions in foreign countries).
" Convention, supra note 2, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 97 (West
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Foreign litigants, therefore, have utilized the liberal United States
discovery procedures while simultaneously attempting to shield them-
Supp. 1985). West Germany made several declarations and reservations which limit
evidence-taking procedures. These include:
(1) All Letters of Request must be in the German language. The Con-
vention, however, permits either French or English translations, unless
otherwise specified. Convention, supra note 2, art. 4, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 note at 89, 97.
(2) Prior authorization is required if "members of the requesting court
of another Contracting State" wish to be present at the execution of the
Letter of Request. According to the Hague Convention, if no such dec-
laration is made, the requesting nation may have someone present. Id. art.
8, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 89, 97.
(3) Certain restrictions may be imposed on the use of diplomatic agents.
Id. art. 16, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note ai 91, 97. Interestingly,
Germany specifically stated that no prior permission is required if the person
to be examined is a dual citizen of the requesting state. The Conference
considered, but deliberately omitted, any discussion of the issue of dual
citizenship. See Amram, Proposed Evidence Convention, supra note 23, at
655.
(4) The local German court may control the preparation and actual taking
of the evidence. Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 note at 91, 97.
(5) Refused to declare that West Germany will aid a nation by using
compulsion under article 18. The request to the person from whom evidence
is sought must specifically note that the person cannot be compelled to
appear. Id. art. 21, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 91, 97.
(6) Germany may specify conditions as to the time and location of taking
evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents, and commissioners. Ad-
ditionally, West Germany retained the right to have German authorities
present at such an event. Id. art. 17, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note
at 91, 97; id. art. 19, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 91, 97.
(7) West German courts will not execute Letters of Request issued for
the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery. Id. art. 23, reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 92, 97.
All the West German declarations were not restrictive. For example, West Germany
did not exercise its right to require prior permission before a diplomatic officer,
consular agent, or commissioner takes evidence of the officer's own national without
compulsion. Id. art. 18, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 91, 97. Additionally,
"[clonsistent with authority contained in the Convention West Germany specified
in connection with its ratification that 'the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers
or consular agents is not permissible in its territory if German nationals are in-
volved."' Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 853, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874, 882 (1981).
However, a series of Notes Verbales exchanged between the United States and
West German governments between October 17, 1979, and February 1, 1980, con-
firmed that earlier notes regarding questioning by consular officers remained in effect
notwithstanding ratification of the Hague Convention. This earlier exchange of Notes
Verbales, concluded on October 8, 1956, had created an understanding that "Amer-
ican consular officers could question West German and other non-American nationals,
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selves under the Hague Convention.3 4 Courts interpreting such at-
tempts to avoid the liberal discovery allowed under the Federal Rules
have reached differing interpretations of the function of the Hague
Convention.3 5
III. NON-JUDICIAL RESPONSES
A. Hague Evidence Convention Special Commission Meetings3 6
To further the use of the Hague Convention, a Special Commission
composed of experts on international judicial assistance and repre-
sentatives of the Central Authorities of signatory nations was ap-
pointed to meet periodically "to consider ways in which the existing
Convention machinery could be made to work more effectively." 37
This commission first met in 1978.38
During the 1978 meeting, it became apparent that "a serious mis-
understanding held sway in regard to the concept of 'pretrial discovery
of documents."' 3 9 Many civil law nations had not realized that doc-
ument discovery in common law nations was conducted as a part of
the preparation for trial rather than conducted prior to the instigation
of litigation. 40 Because several of the nations originally making article
23 reservations prohibiting Letters of Request issued for the purpose
of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents had not intended "to
refuse all requests for evidence submitted by the American judicial
authorities before the trial on the merits commenced before the
jury,'"' 4 the Commission determined that it desired
without compulsion of any kind, with an opportunity for the person questioned to
be accompanied by counsel, at the consular premises or [upon the express request
or express consent of the person to be questioned]." Id. at 854, 176 Cal. Rptr. at
882. For the complete text of these Notes Verbales, see HANDBOOK, supra note 21,
at 64-69.
-1 Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y.
May 30, 1984) (available Jan. 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
See infra notes 59-112 and accompanying text.
" See also supra note 23.
Delegation Report, supra note 2, at 1471. Accord Pfund, United States Par-
ticipation in International Unification of Private Law, 19 INT'L LAW. 505 (1985).
1 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 1424; HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 36.
Note that many of the participating nations had only recently become signatories
to the Convention and, therefore, had not dealt extensively with the Convention's
provisions. Convention Report, supra note 22, at 1424.
Id. at 1428, HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 37.




that the State Parties to the Convention and those which were to
become Parties withdraw or never make this reservation, or at least
that they restrict by declaration the application of the reservation
to Letters of Request which are not sufficiently specific, taking as
their example the declaration made by the United Kingdom.4 2
In May 1985, the Special Commission met for the second time.
Pretrial discovery of documents and article 23 reservations constituted
the "core issues" of the meeting. 43 Again it was determined that the
Convention had been "poorly drafted as shown by the misunder-
standing resulting from the expression employed-'pre-trial discov-
ery."'44 The experts concluded, however, that some form of restriction
was necessary as a protection from "unreasonable or overly burden-
some" discovery requests. 45 The limited reservation made by the
United Kingdom was again generally approved. 46
The Commission also discussed problems generated by the existence
of blocking statutes47 designed to prevent the disclosure of evidence
for use in foreign tribunals. 4 The Commission recognized that
serious problems had arisen as a result of the co-existence of blocking
statutes and the article 23 reservation. Indeed, the combined effect
of a blocking statute and a general, unrestricted reservation under
article 23, may paralyse [sic] the Convention and has caused the
courts in the United States not to use the Convention. 49
B. Variant Article 23 Reservations
As noted by the Special Commission, the Hague Convention pro-
vision which has generated the most controversy is article 23, which
42 Id.
41 Second Report, supra note 2, at 1675.
1 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 1428; HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 37;
accord, Second Report, supra note 2, at 1676.
Second Report, supra note 2, at 22.
Id. at 22, 24. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text; infra note 59.
47 See Second Report, supra note 2, at 1678-79.
Statutes which prohibit the production of evidence abroad, commonly
known as 'blocking statutes', many of which have been adopted since the
1978 meeting of the Special Commission, are in part a response to what
are perceived in some countries as exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction by
the courts of other countries. Such statutes however constitute a complicating
factor and emphasize the need for long-term solutions through international
understanding.
Id. See Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law:
An Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV.
877 (1982) for an in-depth discussion of blocking statutes.
11 Second Report, supra note 2, at 1675.
41 Id. at 1677.
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allows a signatory nation to declare that it "will not execute Letters
of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries." 50 This provision,
directed at perceived abuses in the United States discovery procedures,
was included just prior to the signing of the Convention and generated
very little discussion." While five signatory nations 2 have made the
unlimited reservation cited above, seven other nations53 have imple-
mented a modified reservation designed to include Letters requiring
a person:
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which
the Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession,
custody or power; or
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents
specified in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to
the requesting court to be, or likely to be, in his possession, custody
or power.
54
1o Convention, supra note 2, art. 23, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at
92 (West Supp. 1985).
51 Martens, supra note 14, at 122-23. This lack of discussion and/or negotiation
may account for the continued criticism of the "poorly drafted" article. See supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
.2 France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. During the Second meeting
of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention in May 1985,
both France and Germany "gave some indication of modifying full article 23 re-
servation to limited one." Second Delegation Telegram, supra note 8, at 1. This is
a direct result of the following conclusions reached by experts, see infra note 72
and accompanying text, attending the meeting:
1. The discussions have clearly shown the necessity for a substantial
number of States of a reservation in order to avoid abuses which can arise
in connection with pre-trial discovery of documents. However, the adoption
of an unqualified reservation as permitted by article 23 would seem to be
excessive and detrimental to the proper operation of the Convention.
2. The tendency which has appeared since 1978 and which has led a
number of States to limit their reservations has gained ground, and the
majority of States are now prepared to frame - or, to the extent that they
have not yet done so, to limit - their reservations along the lines of the
reservation formulated by the United Kingdom or the reservation contained
in the Protocol drawn up under the auspices of the Organization of American
States.
Second Report, supra note 2, at 1678.
13 Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Note that Denmark, Finland and Sweden are civil law countries, yet they
will participate in at least some common law pretrial discovery.
"' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note at 101-102 (West Supp. 1985) (article 23 reservation
of the United Kingdom).
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In addition to the United States, four nations have chosen not to
make an article 23 reservation. 5
C. Blocking Statutes
Several Hague Convention nations have enacted blocking statutes
specifically designed to prevent their nationals from disclosing evi-
dence for use in foreign tribunals.16 These nations believe that their
judicial sovereignty is usurped when their nationals are required by
a foreign tribunal to disclose information which is privileged under
that nation's law.17 A prime example is the French blocking statute
which specifically states that its nationals are prohibited from dis-
closing "documents or information of an economic, commercial,
industrial, financial or technical nature" requested "[o]utside of in-
ternational treaties or conventions. 58
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSES
A. United States
Whereas early state court decisions followed Hague Convention
proceduret because of a lack of knowledge as to how foreign courts
would treat a Letter of Request (particularly if that nation had made
an article 2319 reservation), 6° federal courts, in contrast, required
55 Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, and Israel.
" See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
51 See Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in
Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Nondis-
closure Laws].
,8 Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d
686, 688 (1984). For a discussion of the blocking statutes of the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, South Africa, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium on antitrust
litigation, see Pettit and Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982); see also
Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra note 57.
" See supra notes 50-55 for a discussion of the various reservations made by
Hague Convention signatories pursuant to article 23 of the Convention.
60 E.g., Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 175
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981). At the time of the decision, no precedent existed for requiring
a foreign litigant properly before the court to produce evidence in violation of its
own nation's law and procedures. Id. The court recognized that it had the power
to require foreign litigants to "elect between the demands of the California court
and the sensitivities of the West German government, and to risk the sanctions
authorized by California law should it elect not to give the required discovery." Id.
at 857, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884. However, the court held that the Hague Convention
should be pursued at that time. Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
The court stated that it believed that West Germany's declaration of its intent
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litigants to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6' For example,
the California Court of Appeals, in Pierburg & Co. v. Superior
Court,62 required litigants to follow Hague Convention guidelines as
a matter of judicial self-restraint rather than as a matter of inter-
national law. 63 The court noted that its decision was influenced by
a lack of information as to how German courts would treat a Letter
of Request for written interrogatories. 64
In contrast, the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, in Laksy v. Continental Products Corp. ,65 held that since
it was unclear whether the discovery requests constituted violations
of German law or infringements upon Germany's judicial sover-
eignty, 66 it was inappropriate to limit the parties' discovery solely to
Hague Convention procedures. 67 The court stated that its conclusion
was supported by West Germany's article 23 declaration that it would
not execute Letters of Request to obtain pretrial discovery. 6 Because
"Letters of Request are the only method of compelling" discovery
under the Hague Convention, the court determined that such a re-
not to participate in pre-trial discovery should be tested because "[tihe Convention
expressly contemplates that the German courts should seek in good faith to implement
any legitimate discovery procedure the California court may request." Id. at 858,
176 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
1' E.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F. 2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion
of the differences between the procedures under the Hague Convention and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text.
- 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982).
6 Id. at 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
64 Id. at 247, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
[Piresently available sources do not reveal how West Germany would
treat a letter of request by plaintiffs to allow defendant [German corpo-
ration] to answer written interrogatories in that nation. The answer . . . is
to require plaintiffs to attempt to obtain defendant's answers to the written
interrogatories under the Convention.
Id.
The Pierburg and Volkswagenwerk courts relied extensively upon an earlier de-
cision, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 219 (1973), which discussed whether the Hague Convention was controlling.
The first Volkswagenwerk case, decided in 1973, referred to the Conven-
tion, but it was a pre-Convention case, since West Germany did not ratify
the convention until 1979. The Pierburg court mistakenly read the first
Volkswagenwerk case as construing the United States' obligations under
the Convention.
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 518 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citation omitted).
6 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
- See supra note 100.




striction "would severely restrict the plaintiffs' scope of discovery.'' 69
While some federal courts have held the Hague Convention ap-
plicable whenever foreign nationals are parties to suits, 70 others have
found that the controlling issue is not the citizenship of the party,
but the location of the evidence to be produced.7 1 There has even
been some uncertainty within courts as to the proper approach. For
instance, in Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines,72 the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that United States
litigants are obligated to request assistance from a foreign government
pursuant to Hague Convention procedures whenever the litigant wishes
to obtain evidence from a national of that country.73
The same Illinois court, however, rejected this argument one year
later in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. ,4 holding that the controlling
issue is not the citizenship of the party, but where the evidence-taking
proceeding is to be conducted. 75 Thus, if the documents are to be
produced in the United States, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
not the Hague Convention, should be followed, even if the infor-
mation to be produced is located abroad. 76 In Renfield Corp. v. E.
Remy Martin & Co., S.A., 77 however, the Delaware District Court
took a more moderate approach, holding that the Hague Convention
governs the discovery of any documents located abroad, but has no
applicability to documents located within the United States.7 1
Many courts, such as the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter
Corp. ,79 have traditionally held that, in the interest of international
relations and comity,80 initial efforts to obtain evidence abroad should
-' Id.
7,, E.g., Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
211 (N.D. 111. 1983).
7, E.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del.
1982).
7 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 211.
Id. at 214.
71 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
7 Id. at 521.
71, Id.
77 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982).
Id. at 444.
7' 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
8 Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of
law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency. Although more than
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follow Hague Convention procedures." The rationale is that ignoring
the Hague Convention would "permit one sovereign to foist its legal
procedures upon another whose internal rules are dissimilar." 82 Such
action, in the courts' view, "would run afoul of the interests of
sound international relations and comity." '83 However, these courts
generally reserve the right to resort to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the event that such initial efforts prove futile.14
Interestingly, recent federal courts have rejected this procedure,
using the identical rationale. 5 For example, the Graco 6 court stated
that in its view, "the greatest insult to the civil law countries' sov-
ereignty would be for American courts to invoke their judicial aid
merely as a first resort, subject to the eventual override of their
rulings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. '87
Recent decisions indicate that both state and federal courts are
completely rejecting the use of the Hague Convention.88 This position
mere courtesy and accomodation, comity does not achieve the force of an
imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding
which demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be
withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the
nation called upon to give it effect.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir.
1971), quoted in Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinefabrik Und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 329
S.E.2d 492, 505 n.15 (W. Va. 1985).
11 Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 61. This
is the general approach of state courts. See, e.g., Pierburg & Co. v. Superior Court,
137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers de la
Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984); Goldschmidt A.G.
v. Smith, 676 S.W. 2d 443 (Tex. App. 1984). But see Wilson v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (A.D. 1985).
12 Philadelphia Gear Corp., 100 F.R.D. at 60.
I /d.
Id. at 61.
In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir. 1985), appeal filed.
8 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
" Id. at 523. For a discussion of the principle of judicial sovereignty, see supra
note 100. See also McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D.
Pa. 1984), which stated that: "Arguably at least, the Evidence Convention has no
application at all to the production, in this country, by a party within the jurisdiction
of this court, of evidence pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
at 958. The McLaughlin court required the foreign national to produce the names
and qualifications of all trial witnesses or face their preclusion. Id.
This position was recently extended by a District of Columbia court which asserted
that a United States court could force foreign nationals to submit to a deposition
in the United States or in a nearby non-Hague Convention nation. Work v. Bier,
106 F.R.D. 45, 52 n.10 (D.D.C. 1985).
-8 See Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (A.D. 1985)
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was taken by the Fifth Circuit89 in In re Anschuetz & Co.9° and In
re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH.9' In these decisions, the
court held that Hague Convention procedures were to be used when
taking the involuntary deposition of a party within a foreign country
and when seeking the production of documents or other evidence in
a foreign country from one not subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the court. 92 However, the court held that the Hague Convention
has no application to (1) the production of documents within the
United States by a party subject to the court's in personam juris-
diction, 93 or (2) involuntary depositions conducted on United States
soil.
94
In reaching these conclusions, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment that the Hague Convention procedures constitute the exclusive
means for obtaining evidence abroad. First, the court found that
the Convention does not purport to be the exclusive means to
obtain evidence abroad. 95 Further, the court noted that the purpose
of the Convention was to improve rather than thwart the taking
(following the Anschuetz decision in rejecting the use of Hague Convention pro-
cedures).
" The Fifth Circuit is the first circuit to review the issue. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d
at 605.
- Id. at 604.
"1 757 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1985), appeal filed. The court followed the earlier
Anschuetz decision, but went a step further to perform a comity analysis rather
than leaving that to the district court on remand, as the Anschuetz court had done.
Id.
I92 Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615. The court also noted that resort to the Hague
Convention might also be necessitated if the discovery sought in Germany becomes
"particularly intrusive." Id.
Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615; Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731.
Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 733. The depositions involved in the Messerschmitt
case were those of defendant German corporation's trial experts. The court distin-
guished between depositions to take place on foreign soil and those to take place
in the United States pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. The court's
opinion dealt only with those depositions to take place within the United States.
Because the court-ordered depositions involved trial experts of a party subject to
the court's in personam jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit held that in the event of
noncooperation the district court could invoke any of the sanctions authorized by
the Federal Rules, such as preclusion of the experts' testimony at trial. Id.
15 The court reasoned that since the Hague Convention of November 15, 1965
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters contained a specific provision of exclusiveness ("The present Convention
shall apply in all cases in civil or commercial matters where there is an occasion to
transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad"), the 1970 Evidence
Convention would have also contained such a provision if that had been the intent
of the signatory nations. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615.
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of evidence abroad. 96 Finally, the court concluded that restricting
United States litigants to Hague Convention procedures would im-
pact discovery negatively. 97 Foreign litigants, for example, could
take advantage of liberal discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure while simultaneously shielding their own documents from
discovery through the Hague Convention.98 The court expressed
concern that restricting discovery to Hague Convention procedures
would thus encourage concealment of sensitive or incriminating in-
formation .9
The Anschuetz opinion also rejected the argument that
principles of judicial sovereignty'0 0  and international
Id. at 615. Cf., Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ.
1911 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984) (available Jan. 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file):
In the absence of any clear language, or compelling statutory history,
confirming such an unlikely intention, I find it most doubtful that the
United States, in adopting the treaty, had any intention to place its nationals
at such a disadvantage. It seems a far more sensible interpretation that
the treaty was intended to provide mechanisms for the taking of discovery
in civil law countries in a manner that would not affront the sovereignty
of those nations. I therefore find no inconsistency between the discovery
here sought and the provisions of the Convention.
In recommending the treaty to the President, Secretary of State William
P. Rogers noted that '[a] significant aspect of the Evidence Convention is
the fact that although it requires little change in the present procedures in
the United States it promotes changes, in the direction of modern and
efficient procedures in the present practices of many other states' . . ..
Similarly, Philip Amram, the Rapporteur to the Commission that drafted
the Convention stated that it would require 'no major changes in U.S.
procedure [nor] in U.S. legislation or rules.' (citations omitted).
Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 606-08.
Insofar as [petitioner] seeks discovery it would be permitted the full range
of free discovery provided by the Federal Rules. But when a United States
adversary sought discovery, this discovery would be limited to the cum-
bersome procedures and narrow range authorized by the Convention.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Defendant cannot be allowed to shield crucial documents from discovery
by parties with whom it has dealt in the United States merely by storing
them with its affiliate abroad. Nor can it shield documents by destroying
its own copies and relying on customary access to copies maintained by its
affiliate abroad. If one defendant could so easily evade discovery, every
United States company would have a foreign affiliate for storing sensitive
documents.
Cooper Industries v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
I'' The principle of judicial sovereignty rests on the civil law idea that evidence-
taking is a matter for the courts. Parties to a lawsuit are relegated to a position of
[Vol. 16:73
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comity'0 require litigants to use Hague Convention procedures when
seeking evidence located abroad.'0 2 Other courts had stated that a
litigant initially should proceed under Hague Convention proce-
dures.103 Resort to the Federal Rules was then permitted if initial
efforts proved unsuccessful.0 4 The Fifth Circuit rejected the judicial
sovereignty argument because to overrule or to ignore a foreign
nation'a refusal to execute a Letter of Request would constitute a
more serious affront to the nation's judicial sovereignty than would
completely avoiding a conflict all together. 05 There is currently an
appeal of the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Anschuetz and Messerschmitt
pending before the United States Supreme Court.' °6
Whereas the Anschuetz court left analysis of comity considerations
to the district court on remand,'0 7 the Messerschmitt court chose to
assisting judicial authorities. A Letter of Request, therefore, does not inteifere with
a requested state's legal procedures because the evidence is gathered by the
foreign government's judicial authorities. A commissioner, however, might interfere
with the nation's judicial sovereignty because the commissioner acts as an extended
arm of the other nation. The examination is conducted under the procedures of the
state granting the commission. Thus, the method of the examination could easily
conflict with the procedures of the authorized by the foreign government. Edwards,
supra note 22, at 649.
For a discussion of the principle of international comity, see supra note 80.
,02 Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 613.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 57
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (respect for the judicial sovereignty of a foreign nation requires
the use of Hague Convention procedures). This is the general approach of state
courts. See, e.g., Pierburg & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d
840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193
N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984); Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W. 2d
443 (Tex. App. 1984). But see Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d
575 (A.D. 1985).
"I Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 613.
115 Id.
106 The Anschuetz appeal was filed July 17, 1985. The parties' briefs were dis-
tributed to the Court for its September 30, 1985 conference. On October 7, 1985,
the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the
United States. As of November 9, 1985, the Solicitor General had made no such
filing.
The Court has invited the Solicitor General to file a brief on the United States'
view of discovery involving Hague Convention nationals on two prior occasions.
Club Mediterranne, S.A. v. Dorin, 465 U.S. 1019 (1984); Volkswagenwerk A.G.
v. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983). The Solicitor General's office took six months to
prepare its first brief and over eleven months to file the second.
"ll Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731. It is not apparent from the language of the
Anschuetz opinion that this was the court's holding. In fact, it appears that the
Anschuetz court rejected the comity argument by determining that comity was not
implicated when a discovery request was not overly intrusive. Anschuetz, 754 F.2d
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expedite the litigation by weighing competing national interests and
by deciding the legal issues of comity. s08 Recognizing the West German
concern that its nationals might be forced to produce documents
under foreign procedures,1° 9 as well as United States litigants' need
to obtain promptly the documents and deposition testimony necessary
to prepare for complex litigation in an United States court, the court
held that an order for production of documents within the United
States appeared to appropriately balance the considerations involved
and was, therefore, not a violation of the principles of international
comity." 0
B. Other Nations
The United States is not the only Hague Convention signatory to
rule on the Hague Convention-Federal Rules controversy. Courts in
the United Kingdom and West Germany have also considered dis-
covery requests made by United States litigants. These courts generally
consider the Hague Convention to be the exclusive means of obtaining
at 615. Further, the court found that gathering evidence in West Germany for
production in the United States did not constitute "the taking of evidence abroad"
contemplated by the Hague Convention, but constituted "acts preparatory" to the
production of evidence within the United States. Id. at 611. The court based this
construction on the decision of an earlier court which stated:
What is required of [defendant French corporation] on French soil is
certain acts preparatory to the giving of evidence. It must select appropriate
employees to give depositions in the forum state: likewise it must select
the relevant documents which it will reveal to its adversaries in the forum
state. These acts do not call for French judicial participation. If [defendant]
were preparing to bring litigation against United States adversaries in the
United States courts, it would perform the same acts of selecting employee
witnesses and evidentiary documents from its files without participation by
an [sic] French judicial authority. In no way do those acts affront or intrude
on French sovereignty.
Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May
30, 1984), quoted in Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611.
', Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731. The court noted that although the suit was
filed more than two years ago, it remained at the pretrial stage at the time of its
decision. Id. at 731 n.9.
" Id. at 732. The court recognized that United States discovery procedures are
unfamiliar to the German civil law system. Id. For a discussion of the differences
between the United States and German procedures for taking evidence, see supra
notes 5-19 and accompanying text.
1" Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 732. The court noted that "[tihe district court's
order does not require any governmental action in Germany, any appearance in
Germany of foreign attorneys, or any proceedings in Germany. It requires only that
a party admittedly subject to the personal jurisdiction of a United States court
produce documents in the United States." Id.
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evidence from their nationals.' Further, they consider the relevant
question to be the nationality of the party, rather than the place of
production as United States courts do." 2
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Solutions to complicated problems often generate unexpected re-
suits. Occassionally the solution itself raises more problems than it
solves. Though the recent decisions in Anschuetz and Messerschmitt
present a solution to United States litigants' problems of obtaining
discovery abroad, the method employed by the court to reach its
decision may create international policy problems. In making decisions
with international ramifications, courts should consider various com-
peting interests such as the impact on present litigation, the impact
on foreign relations, and the impact of subsequent interpretations of
the decision.
In Anschuetz and Messerschmitt, the Fifth Circuit considered the
impact of its decision based solely on the case before the court. The
primary focus of the court's inquiry was whether the requested in-
formation could be obtained if Hague Convention procedures were
followed." 3 Unfortunately, the court failed to consider ramifications
of its decision on foreign relations and the economic environment of
the United States." 4
- See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Bavarian Ministry of Justice, Docket No. VA 3/
80, (Overlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) October 31, 1980), reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 1049 (1981); ITT v. Bavarian Ministry of Justice, Docket No. VA 4/80
(Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) November 27, 1980), reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 1025 (1981).
112 See Siemens, 20 I.L.M. at 1049; ITT v. Bavarian Ministry of Justice, 20 I.L.M.
at 1025.
Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 607.
"I Because of the political, military, and economic importance of the United
States, many countries will be reluctant to oppose discovery orders of United
States courts. These countries are faced with a choice between acquiescing
in what they perceive to be a violation of their sovereignty and complicating
their relations with the major Western power. Predictably, many countries
friendly to the United States frequently acquiesce, with or without verbal
protest. Resentment accumulates, however, and those countries may retaliate
by withholding cooperation in other matters. Thus, the decision to rely on
the inherent political, military, and economic power of the United States
to induce acquiesence is not without potential long-term political cost and
embarrassment. American courts must be circumspect in deciding to rely
on that power to obtain discovery. Demonstrations of national strength
are quintessentially political and federal, not judicial or local.
Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining
Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MtAMI L.
REV. 733, 786 (1983).
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The recent United States court decisions have not fully appreciated
the fact that foreign displeasure with United States discovery pro-
cedure was an impetus behind the Hague Convention.' The United
States joined nations drafting the Hague Convention in an effort to
promote judicial cooperation.11 6 For example, the provision allowing
nations to refuse to execute Letters of Request seeking pretrial dis-
covery was included to allay concerns regarding liberal United States
discovery procedures."17 United States ratification of the Convention
implied an agreement to respect the concerns of nations objecting to
United States discovery procedures. The recent Fifth Circuit decisions
have failed to address these concerns." 8 Rather than examining West
Germany's motive for the reservation, the court focused exclusively
on its own interest in maintaining control over parties subject to the
court's jurisdiction. For example, the court did not consider whether
the decision would adversely affect West Germany's willingness to
enter into future treaty negotiations with the United States."19
In holding that foreign nationals doing business within the United
States are subject to the jurisdiction and procedures of United States
courts, the Fifth Circuit failed to consider how such a finding might
affect a foreign corporation's decision to expand into the United
States market. State, local, and national leaders are making vigorous
efforts to entice foreign corporations to open offices and plants in
the United States. 2 0 An increase in international business correspond-
ingly brings about an increased number of lawsuits. -'2' Thus, foreign
"I See Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611; see also supra notes 10, 39-46, 49-55 and
accompanying text.
16 See Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance Under the Federal
Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters: An Exposition of the Procedures and a Practical Example: In
Re Westinghouse Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101,
103-4 (1980); see also supra notes 13, 22, 96 and accompanying text.
1,7 Augustine, supra note 116, at 103-04. See also supra notes 8, 39-46, 50-55 and
accompanying text.
"I Cf. Martens, supra note 14, at 124 ("It is fair to say that the reservation did
not achieve what Germany hoped to accomplish with it: a device to avoid the
perceived abuses of United States pre-trial discovery.")
"I The court failed to consider how this decision would be viewed by the other
signatory nations, for example, whether the decision would be viewed as a "necessary
evil" in order to do justice to the parties or simply a blatant disregard for other
nation's interest in protecting its nationals from unnecessary discovery. See also
supra note 114.
I2 Ellinis, Rolling Out a Red Carpet, NATION'S Bus., Aug. 1985, at 53.
121 See Augustine, supra note 116, at 102.
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corporations concerned about United States judicial procedure may
choose not to do business within the United States.122
The Fifth Circuit also failed to consider subsequent interpretations
of its decision. The Anschuetz opinion stated that depositions under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might be taken outside a foreign
party's nation to avoid violating the nation's judicial sovereignty. 2 1
The recent District of Columbia decision in Work v. Bier'24 interpreted
this position as follows: "an American federal court [can] order a
deposition of a foreign national to take place in a nearby non-Hague
Convention State or in the United States" (emphasis added). 25 The
exclusion of other Hague Convention nations reveals that the district
court was aware that signatory nations would consider the deposition
a violation to the law of the United States. 2 6
Courts faced with discovery requests involving foreign nationals
should balance the competing interests discussed above. This prop-
osition is not new and has been advocated by recent commentators. 2 7
22 Cf. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, United States
Department of State Current Policy No. 697 at 2 (May 1985) (available from the
United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Public
Communication, Editorial Division, Washington, D.C.); Shultz, Trade, Interde-
pendence and Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 36 S.C.L. REV. 295 (1985).
"2 Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611, n.25.
'-4 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.).
12' Id. at 52 n.10.
'26 The court's actions may also be considered a violation of international law.
"An international agreement is binding in accordance with its terms and each party
has a duty to give them effect . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 138 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]
,27 For example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40 provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct on the part
of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good
faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light
of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.
For an excellent description of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) balancing test, along with
a discussion of proposed revisions, see Robinson, Compelling Discovery and Evidence
in International Litigation, 18 INT'L LAW. 533 (1984); Recent Development, 25 VA.
J. INT'L L. 249 (1984).
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Requiring courts to balance competing interests does not imply that
all discovery requests should conform to Hague Convention proce-
dures. 12 Rather, it requires courts to view each discovery request in
terms of the potential impact it might have outside the scope of the
litigation. A balancing test would better serve both the immediate
interests of the litigants and the long-term interests of the United
States.
Denise L. Dunham
I2 But see Bishop, supra note 29, at 67 (arguing that "the Convention's legislative
history [and] the rules of interpretation" point to "the conclusion that the Convention
provides the exclusive procedures for obtaining evidence located in a Convention
country. Moreover, it is clear that the Convention applies to parties and encompasses




JURISDICTION DIGEST OF CASES
FEDERAL CASES
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Club Mediterrane, S.A. v. Dorin, 105 S.Ct. 286 (1984) (mem.). Dismissed
appeal of New York trial court order directing a French national to answer
interrogatories pursuant to state law in violation of a French blocking statute.
The Solicitor General's Brief for the United States filed as Amicus Curiae
took the position that the Hague Convention is not exclusive nor does it
supersede traditional discovery methods under federal and state rules of civil
procedure. However, principles of comity require United States courts to
utilize the procedures established in the Hague Convention to avoid inter-
national friction arising from the enforcement of extraterritorial discovery
orders. Under this approach, the court would nevertheless retain the authority
to impose sanctions on a litigant who was not complying with the requests.
The brief urged that each case should perform a comity analysis, balancing
competing interests. Because the lower court did not appear to have made
such a review, the Solicitor General recommended that the Court deny
review of the orders at that time.
Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984) (mem.), reh. den.
104 S.Ct. 1932 (1984) (mem.). Dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, appeal
of Michigan trial court's order permitting Plaintiff to depose German cor-
porate defendant's employees in the Federal Republic of Germany. In his
amicus curiae brief filed at the Court's request on behalf of the United
States, the Solicitor General stated that the Department of State planned
to instruct United States consular officials to refuse to comply with the
lower court's order. Since this would preclude the taking of the depositions
ordered by the Michigan court, the Solicitor General advised the Court to
dismiss the appeal. The Solicitor General maintained that the trial court's
orders conflicted with the obligations of the United States under the Hague
Convention, were not authorized by an earlier exchange of notes between
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and were therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
D.C. CIRCUIT
Pain v. United States Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. den. 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Forum non conveniens decision. Suggested
in dicta that Hague Convention procedures would be the only available
means of obtaining certain evidence.
FIRST CIRCUIT
Boreri v. Fiat S.p.A., 763 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1985). Declined to balance
the competing interests necessary to decide the force and effect of the Hague
19861
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Convention because the order appealed from was not final. However, the
court noted that the courts seemed sharply divided on the issue, stating that
a balance must eventually be struck throughout the federal court system.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), appeal filed. Hague
Convention procedures are to be used when taking the involuntary deposition
of a party within a foreign country and when seeking the production of
documents or other evidence in a foreign country from one not subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the court. However, the court held that the
Hague Convention has no application to (1) the production of documents
in the United States by a party subject to the court's in personam jurisdiction
or (2) involuntary depositions conducted on United States soil.
In re Messerschmidt Bolkow Blohm, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), appeal
filed. Followed the earlier Anschuetz decision, but performed a comity
analysis to determine that an order for production of documents within the
United States appeared to appropriately balance the considerations involved
and was therefore not a violation of the principles of international comity.
DELA WARE
Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del.
1982). Controlling issue is not the citizenship of the party, but the location
of the evidence to be produced. Thus, the Hague Convention governs the
discovery of any documents located abroad, but has no applicability to
documents located within the United States. Interestingly, the parties did
not argue that the Hague Convention controlled evidence located in France;
therefore, the court applied choice of law principles to find that the United
States had the most significant relationship with the communications in
question.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C.
1984). Although Hague Convention procedures do not constitute the exclusive
means for the taking of evidence, the court deferred ordering the West
German defendant to comply with discovery requests for thirty days to
allow the German authorities and the parties time to attempt to come to
an agreement regarding reasonable parameters for discovery in West Ger-
many.
Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985)(Mag.). Asserted that a United
States court could force a foreign national to submit to a deposition in the
United States (pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) or in a
nearby non-Hague Convention nation to avoid infringing on Germany's
judicial sovereignty. Allowed the parties to stipulate that the depositigns
would take place in Germany, but stated that the court would force them
to take place in the United States if the parties were unable to reach an
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agreement. This comprehensive, in-depth opinion is particularly noteworthy
since the court allowed a non-party (one of Defendants' United States general
counsel) to file an amicus curiae brief.
ILLINOIS-NOR THERN DISTRICT
General Electric Co., Medical Systems Division v. North Star International,
Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 207 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Controlling issue is the
location of the documents; thus, when the evidence is located abroad, the
Hague Convention applies, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
to evidence located within the United States.
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Rejected
earlier Schroeder rationale, holding that the controlling issue is not the
citizenship of the party, but where the evidence-taking procedure is to be
conducted. Thus, if the documents are to be produced in the United States,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - not the Hague Convention - should
be followed, even if the information to be produced is located abroad.
Also rejected initial use of Hague Convention, stating that "the greatest
insult to the civil law countries' sovereignty would be for American courts
to invoke their judicial aid merely as a first resort, subject to the eventual
override of their rulings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.,
101 F.R.D. at 509.
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
211 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Hague Convention procedures apply whenever foreign
nationals are parties to suits.
MASSA CHUSSETTS
Slauenwhite v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken, 104 F.R.D. 616 (D. Mass.
1985). Hague Convention does not prohibit the taking of discovery in the
United States from a West German corporation subject to the court's in
personam jurisdiction. Further, West German defendant may have waived
any right to object to discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure vis-a-vis itself (but not the West German government) when it
voluntarily produced a West German witness in the United States to testify
on jurisdictional issues.
NEW YORK-SOUTHERN DISTRICT
Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1911
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984) (available Jan. 22, 1986 on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file). No threat to France's judicial sovereignty when the
documents located in France are to be produced on United States soil because
the gathering of the documents involves no participation of the French
judiciary; therefore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are controlling.
Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D.
16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Although the Hague Convention procedures are not
the exclusive means of taking evidence abroad, its procedures should be the
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first avenue of discovery. Should those efforts fail, the court reserved the
right to compel the requested discovery.
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). Ordered British corporate defendant to comply with discovery pur-
suant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that Defendant had
waived the protection of the Hague Convention by first telling the United
States plaintiff to go through defendant's United States agent, rather than
its British offices. Further, Great Britain's sovereignty is not implicated with
the production of documents, only depositions. Finally, the court noted that
a corporation cannot be allowed to shield documents simply by storing them
abroad (Defendant's United States employees should have had access to the
documents in question on a daily basis).
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Mag.). Hague Convention does not apply to the discovery
of evidence available in the United States and its application to evidence
located abroad is discretionary. Because West Germany has indicated that
it will not execute Letters of Request issued to obtain pre-trial discovery of
documents and the Hague Convention machinery "is quite slow and costly
even when the foreign government agrees to cooperate," the court refused
to require litigants to follow Convention procedures, noting that "the First
Amendment issues at stake here should not be further delayed except for
the most compelling of reasons and no such reasons have been suggested."
PENNSYL VANIA-EASTERN DISTRICT
Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F.Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Because it was unclear whether discovery requests were violations of German
law or infringements upon Germany's judicial sovereignty, the court held
it inappropriate to limit the parties' discovery solely to Hague Convention
procedures (noting that Germany had stated that it would not execute Letters
of Request to obtain pretrial discovery). Since Letters of Request are the
only method of compelling discovery under the Hague Convention, such a
restriction would severely restrict the plaintiff's scope of discovery.
McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
Required foreign party to produce the names and qualifications of all trial
witnesses or face their preclusion, stating that "[a]rguably at least, the
Evidence Convention has no application at all to the production, in this
country, by a party within the jurisdiction of this court, of evidence pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The court further noted that the
Hague Convention does not control a United States trial.
Performance Industries, Inc. v. Honda Motor Co., No. 83-4863 (E.D.
Pa. March 1, 1985) (available Jan. 22, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Dist file). Rejected argument that Hague Convention applies to discovery
requests directed at Japanese nationals because even though Japan may have
participated in the preparation of the Convention and had some role in the
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formulation of its terms, the Convention had never entered into force
regarding Japan.
Philadelphia Gear Corporation v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D.
58 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Respect for the judicial sovereignty of a foreign nation
requires the initial use of Hague Convention procedures. However, the court
reserved the right to resort to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
event that such initial efforts prove futile. The controlling issue is not the
citizenship of the party, but the location of the evidence to be produced
(ignoring the Hague Convention would allow one sovereign to force its legal
procedures upon another whose internal laws are different, which would
run afoul of the interests of sound international relations and comity).
TENNESSEE- WESTERN DISTRICT
Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985). Followed the
Anschuetz and Messerschmidt opinions in holding that the Hague Convention
does not apply to discovery efforts in this country directed to a foreign
national over whom the court has in personam jurisdiction. Discovery re-
quests served on a party within the United States are deemed to occur in
the United States regardless of the location of information sought. Specif-
ically refused to force discovery within Germany, but provided for full
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanctions on failure to comply with the
discovery requests.
VERMONT
Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfrabrick, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Ver.
1984). Principles of comity do not require a United States plaintiff to use
Hague Convention procedures where the foreign defendant has already
answered two sets of interrogatories, further delay would impede litigation
and Hague Convention requests would likely be futile. The procedures
authorized be the Hague Convention are not required, but permissive.
STATE CASES
CALIFORNIA
Dr. Ing H.C.F. Porche A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755,
177 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981). Hague Convention controls matters of pre-trial
discovery in litigation involving a foreign national as a party.
Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982). Required litigants to follow Hague Convention guide-
lines as a matter of judicial self-restraint rather than as a matter of inter-
national law; decision influenced by a lack of information as to how German
courts would treat a Letter of Request for written interrogatories.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal.
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Rptr. 219 (1973). Pre-Hague Convention case, later cited by court as if
determined under Hague Convention.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981). Followed Hague Convention procedures because of
a lack of knowledge as to how foreign courts would treat a Letter of
Request.
DELA WARE
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulac, S.A., No. 6525 (Del.
Ch. November 24, 1981) (available Jan. 22, 1986, on LEXIS, States
library, Del file). Refused to order parties to follow Hague Convention
procedures where French corporation was being sued under a stock purchase
agreement in which it agreed to be bound by Delaware law. The court noted
that France had declared that it would not execute Letters of Request which
sought pre-trial discovery; therefore, requiring the parties to follow Hague
Convention procedures would effectively preclude the United States plaintiff
from pre-trial discovery.
NEW JERSEY
Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475
A.2d 686 (1984). When Defendant sought protection from discovery orders
based on French blocking statute, the court ordered discovery to be initially
conducted pursuant to Hague Convention procedures. Decision was influ-
enced by the court's receipt of a letter from French officials stating that
they would comply with requests made pursuant to the Hague Convention.
Nevertheless, the court informed the parties that they could return to court
if the initial efforts under the Hague Convention proved futile.
NEW YORK
Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 108 A.D. 2d 393, 489 N.Y.S. 2d
575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). Resort to Hague Convention procedures not
mandated where evidence to be obtained is located within the United States.
In dicta, stated that Hague Convention's application to discovery located
abroad is discretionary.
TEXAS
Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App. 1984).
Ordered parties to proceed under the Hague Convention as a matter of
comity and judicial restraint until a weighing of interests makes it clear that
an order authorizing actions outside the Convention are necessary to prevent
an impasse. This decision was made in spite of a letter from the West
Germany Embassy opposing the depositions, stating that Hague Convention
procedures are exclusive.
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WEST VIRGINIA
Gbr. Eickhoff Maschinefabrik Und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492 (W. Va. 1985). Although the Hague Convention does not constitute
the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad, international comity
dictates that first resort to those procedures be made until it appears that
these efforts have proven fruitless and further action is necessary to prevent
an impasse.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
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